Do Desperate Times Really Call for Desperate Measures? The Ethical Dilemma Behind the Regulation and Use of Experimental Drugs by Kuehn, Lauren
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 8
5-3-2017
Do Desperate Times Really Call for Desperate
Measures? The Ethical Dilemma Behind the
Regulation and Use of Experimental Drugs
Lauren Kuehn
lkuehn@alumni.nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Other
Chemicals and Drugs Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame
Journal of International & Comparative Law by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kuehn, Lauren (2017) "Do Desperate Times Really Call for Desperate Measures? The Ethical Dilemma Behind the Regulation and




DO DESPERATE TIMES REALLY CALL FOR DESPERATE 
MEASURES? THE ETHICAL DILEMMA BEHIND THE REGULATION 
AND USE OF EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS 
 
 
LAUREN KUEHN * 
 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 134 
I. EXPANDED ACCESS AND THE DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS ............................... 137 
A. The Drug Approval Process: The U.S. .................................................... 138 
B. The Drug Approval Process Abroad: The EU ......................................... 141 
II. THE DEBATE .................................................................................................... 147 
III. EBOLA: A HEALTH CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN ............................ 154 
A. Ethical Considerations Revisited ............................................................. 156 
B. The Recent Results from the rVSV-ZEBOV Trial and the Lessons  
Learned ......................................................................................................... 160 
IV. THE FUTURE OF DRUG REGULATION ............................................................. 163 






Throughout the decades, public health crises have shaped the regulation of 
drug approvals and public access to newly invented drug treatments.1  In 1962, 
for instance, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) introduced stringent 
testing and approval procedures in response to serious birth defects from the use 
of thalidomide by pregnant females without sufficient safety testing.2  The FDA 
was prompted yet again to implement new strategies in approving drugs as a 
result of the AIDS crisis.  New policies and regulations were proposed and 
implemented, including features of European systems, which accelerated access 
to new experimental drugs for life-threatening illnesses.3  The reality of the 
situation at the apex of the AIDS crisis showed the inadequacy of FDA processes 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2017; B.A. with Honors in 
Political Science and German, College of the Holy Cross, 2013.  I would like to thank my adviser Professor 
Alford along with the many mentors I have been fortunate to have during my time at Notre Dame.  A 
special thank you to my family, especially my parents and fiancé, for their constant support and their 
unconditional love throughout my entire academic career. 
1 See Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 567, 573 
(1985). 
2 21 ROBERT JOHN KANE & LAWRENCE E. SINGER, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS 15 
(3d ed. 2015).  
3 See generally Julie C. Relihan, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An International 
Approach, 13 B.U. INT’L L. J. 229, 238 (1995). 
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from the perspective of terminally ill, frustrated patients.  Not only did a true drug 
lag exist between foreign countries and the United States (U.S.), it was argued 
that there was also no adequate existing treatment available in the first instance.4  
As Wells commented, 
 
The problem that the AIDS crisis presents is quite different than 
those resulting from other diseases.  As of this writing, no 
clearly effective treatment exists.  Additionally, the disease 
appears to be inevitably fatal.  Desperate AIDS sufferers are 
crying out for access to treatment drugs which they know are 
still experimental and unproven.  Arguably, under these special 
circumstances, such individuals should be allowed to make that 
choice.5 
 
 This debate over the access to experimental and investigational treatments for 
life-threatening illnesses has not ceased to exist.  Quite to the contrary, the push 
for better and faster access to experimental treatment has only gotten stronger.  In 
a contested court case, Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, terminally ill patients 
advocated in the U.S. for a fundamental right “to try” experimental treatments.6  
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that 
patients had no fundamental right, protected under due process, to have access to 
investigational drugs.7 
 The importance of the debate over access to experimental treatment is still 
very much alive and well, as seen from the events surrounding the 2014 Ebola 
crisis and what many deem to be a wholly inadequate and inefficient response to 
the Ebola outbreak.8  The outbreak called for the ultimate ethical conundrum as 
the World Health Organization (WHO) proceeded to allow the use of drug 
treatments—that were entirely unapproved and only tested on animals—on 
patients suffering from the life-threatening diseases.9  Generally, the use of 
experimental treatments in the Ebola outbreak showed that “[m]uch more ethical 
work needs to be done to create a sound infrastructure for compassionate use in 
humanitarian emergencies.”10  Ebola prompted a dialogue about the ethical and 
legal ramifications of expediting access to pharmaceutical products that have not 
 
4 See generally Anne E. Wells, Comment, Regulating Experimental AIDS Drugs: A Comparison of 
the United States and France, 12 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 393 (1990).  
5 Id. at 410–11. 
6 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 707 
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008). 
7 See generally id.; see also Allison J. Goodman, Comment, Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach: 
Restricting Access to Potentially Lifesaving Drugs Since 2007, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107, 
125 (2009). 
8 See James G. Hodge et al., Global Emergency Legal Responses to the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, 42 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 595 (2014); see also James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Myths of Ebola Preparedness and 
Response, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 355, 356 (2015); see also Alexandra Sifferlin, WHO 
Vows Reform After Ebola Outbreak Mistakes, TIME (May 18, 2015), http://time.com/3882556/who-reform-
ebola-outbreak-mistakes/. 
9 See Kai Kupferschmidt, Using Experimental Drugs and Vaccines Against Ebola is Ethical, WHO 
Panel Says, SCIENCE MAG. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/08/using-
experimental-drugs-and-vaccines-against-ebola-ethical-who-panel-says. 
10 Id. 
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gone through adequate testing and approval procedures.  The questionable ethical 
atmosphere in which experimental treatments are afforded persists in global 
health dialogue, even after the release of successful results related to a new, 
promising Ebola vaccine.11 
It has also spurred an entire movement throughout the U.S., which has 
resulted in over twenty states introducing “Right to Try” bills since early 2014.12  
The FDA has been the subject of allegations regarding its perceived different 
behavior in times of crisis as compared to times in which terminally ill patients 
domestically seek outlets to retrieve experimental treatments.  As Furchtgott-Roth 
criticizes, “[i]f [the] FDA applied the same sense of urgency to Ebola vaccines in 
the past or to other drugs in its pipeline, millions of people would be better off.  
Instead, it stalls until a crisis arises, resulting in more deaths and untold 
suffering.”13  How the FDA imagines its role in protecting the public health and 
upholding safety and efficacy in the regulation of pharmaceutical products in light 
of this legislative and politically charged movement remains to be seen.  
Regardless, the most recent Ebola crisis and the “Right to Try” movement help 
illuminate an age-old debate in a new period of time.  The ethical, legal, and 
regulatory interests at stake shape the role of the FDA as well as the role drug 
regulation plays internationally both in times of public health crises and in their 
aftermath.  If anything, the legal issues in the pharmaceutical industry have 
become more “complex and politicized because of the increase in global trade.”14 
The regulation of pharmaceutical products generally requires a balance of 
various factors, most importantly public access to accurate information on 
medicines, continued confidence in health systems and professionals, and 
assurance that the manufacture, trade, and use of medicines is under appropriate 
and efficient regulation.15  In many respects, the regulation of drugs is quite 
different from other industries in that it concerns the population as a whole as 
well as serious consequences, including injury and death.16  What many frustrated 
patients neglect in conversations on pharmaceutical legislation and policy is that 
“[t]rying to achieve too much, too quickly, can be tempting[,]” but “[i]t took more 
than a hundred years for pharmaceutical policies and laws to evolve to current 
levels in the industrialized world.”17  
 This Note will explore the regulations and exceptions to the traditional drug 
approval process created by the FDA in order to respond to public health crises as 
well as the wishes and needs of terminally ill patients who have advocated for 
expanded access.  Part I will highlight the regulatory framework in existence, 
exploring the traditional drug approval process, and detailing the various 
exceptions and expanded access and compassionate use programs.  Subsection A 
 
11 See generally Annette Rid & Franklin G. Miller, Ethical Rationale for the Ebola “Ring 
Vaccination” Trial Design, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 432 (2016). 
12 Alexander Gaffney, “Right to Try” Legislation Tracker, REG. AFF. PROF’L SOC’Y, (June 25, 2015) 
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/Right-to-Try/ (last vistied Mar. 9, 2017). 
13  Diane Furchtgott-Roth, The FDA Should Be in Ebola-Mode All the Time, ECONOMICS 21 (Sept. 23, 
2014), https://economics21.org/html/fda-should-be-ebola-mode-all-time-1098.html. 




17 Id. at 102. 
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will explain the regulatory framework present in the U.S. established by the FDA, 
while Subsection B will explain the regulatory framework in the European Union 
(EU) made through the European Medicines Agency (EMA), and will specifically 
provide examples from Germany and the United Kingdom (U.K.).  Part II will 
highlight the main points in the debate over the use of experimental drugs in the 
context of the AIDS crisis and Ebola crisis.  Part III delves into further detail in 
the specific context of the Ebola crisis and exemplifies how the debate on 
experimental drugs can be seen through the eyes of those addressing ethical 
questions over drug regulation in the most recent public health crisis.  Lastly, Part 
IV seeks to demonstrate the importance of this issue in light of the Ebola crisis 
and describes what has been enfolding in its wake, in particular the “Right to Try” 
movement.  Part IV emphasizes the potential risks and harms that will come 
about should the goals of the “Right to Try” movement be realized. 
 Ultimately this Note will argue that, unlike what many patients believe, the 
FDA plays an invaluable and imperative role in seeking the efficacy and safety of 
new treatment options and drugs.  The balance of interests between those who are 
terminally ill, who wish to see increased access to unapproved medicines; the 
general public, who has an interest in preserving the drug approval process; and 
the FDA, who has been mandated by law to safeguard the safety of the general 
public, creates a tension that will continue to go unresolved.  Thus, the patients 
who continue to advocate for routes outside of the FDA regulatory process—
threatening to diminish the strength of the FDA’s presence and to remove many 
new, unapproved drugs from the FDA’s jurisdiction—place the future of drug 
development and regulation in peril.  The FDA’s role should not be eradicated, 
but instead it should be bolstered and preserved.  Public health crises prove not 
that drug regulation is overly cumbersome, unnecessary, and a death sentence for 
patients, but rather that there has never been more of a reason to preserve the role 
the FDA has received by law. 
 
 
I. EXPANDED ACCESS AND THE DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS 
 
 
Generally, in order to be approved for sale, drugs must satisfy four standards:  
efficacy, safety, quality, and clinical use information.  The medication must be 
effective for the indications claimed, it cannot display risks that outweigh its 
potential benefits, it should be well made, and all clinical information regarding 
its use—precautions, adverse effects, and so on—must be provided.18  
Regulations are present in national legislation and regulatory frameworks as well 
as in international guidelines presented by various conferences and organizations, 
including, among others, the WHO, the International Conference on 




18 Id. at 177. 
19 Id. at 3–4, 18. 
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A. The Drug Approval Process: The U.S. 
 
The FDA in the U.S. is enabled for the regulation of pharmaceutical products 
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).20  From the Act’s 
inception, the central focus has been ensuring that the requirement of adequate 
testing before use is enforced.21  Under current federal law, a drug is required to 
be the “subject of an approved marketing application before it is transported and 
distributed across state lines.”22  The FDA requires that there be substantial 
evidence that a “drug is safe and effective for its intended use,” and thus the 
pharmaceutical industry is the subject of “rigorous statistical testing 
procedures.”23  After a drug has been tested on animals, the manufacturer must 
complete a “Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug” in 
order for the drug to be safely given to human volunteers.24  After a drug receives 
“investigational new drug” (IND) status, clinical studies are divided into three 
phases using ever-increasing populations of human patients.  The molecule to be 
tested on humans changes in legal status at this point under the Act and is 
therefore subject to specific requirements under the regulatory system at that 
time.25  Phase I trials allow the drug to be given to a small group of individuals 
and Phase II expands the number of patients who can receive the drug.26  While 
these earlier stages of clinical trials focus on toxicity and efficacy, Phase III trials 
focus on the safety and effectiveness in long-term use, observing side effects and 
interactions with other drugs.27  A “New Drug Application” (NDA), or a request 
for marketing approval, will then be filed and awaits final approval depending on 
a showing of “‘substantial evidence’ that the drug is safe and effective, and that it 
satisfies the [FDA’s requirements] as to the contents of the ‘package insert.’”28  
FDA review of NDAs is statutorily prescribed at 180 days, but in reality can take 
as long as thirty months.29 
Despite having procedures that are generally similar to those of foreign 
countries, the FDA has been criticized for its “drug lag” and has responded to 
criticism by enabling quicker clinical trial progress and quicker access to 
experimental and investigational drugs that have not completed the entire 
approval process.30  There are multiple ways for a patient to bypass normal FDA 
 
20 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938); see also Teff, supra note 1, at 
573. 
21 See Teff, supra note 1, at 573.  
22 Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 1, 2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approval
Applications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/default.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2017). 
23 See Teff, supra note 1, at 573–74. 
24 Id. at 576. 
25 See Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, supra note 22. 
26 See Teff, supra note 1, at 576. 
27 See id. 
28 Id. at 577. 
29 See Alison R. McCabe, Note, A Precarious Balancing Act—The Role of the FDA as Protector of 
Public Health and Industry Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 787, 791 (2003). 
30 See KANE & SINGER, supra note 2, at 15 (“[C]ommentators claim that because of this ‘drug lag,’ 
the FDA drug approval process requirements have caused more deaths and suffering than they have 
prevented.”); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.305; see also Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for 
Treatment Use, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,900 (Aug. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 312 and 316) (“The 
final rule is intended to improve access to investigational drugs for patients with serious or immediately 
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regulatory procedure in order to gain access to a new drug.  Patients can gain 
quicker access to unapproved drugs through compassionate use and expanded 
access programs.  The FDA provides for several quicker routes to access and 
clinical testing that include emergency use or treatment INDs, emergency 
investigational new drug applications (EINDs), fast-track designations to speed 
up the traditional approval process, and emergency use authorizations (EUAs) 
preserved for the most extreme circumstances. 
 If a patient is not eligible to participate in a clinical trial, a drug developer 
and physician may submit an application, reviewed by the FDA on a case-by-case 
basis, in order for the patient to receive a “compassionate exemption.”  The 
exemption will be granted on a showing that:  (a) the patient has given informed 
consent, (b) there is no satisfactory alternative treatment, and (c) the drug is likely 
effective and free of unreasonable risks.31  INDs may also be expedited to meet a 
patient’s need.  An emergency-use IND allows the FDA, for instance, to authorize 
use of an experimental drug in a situation that does not permit enough time for 
submission of a typical IND.  In addition, treatment INDs allow use of 
experimental drugs, which show promise in clinical testing for serious, or 
immediately life-threatening conditions.  The use can take place while the final 
clinical work and FDA review is completed.32  The FDA grants these exemptions 
but with the intention of scrutinizing requests and allowing for exceptions only in 
true emergencies.33  Lastly, physicians may wish to pursue an EIND.  To qualify, 
a physician must show that they consider the product may be urgently needed for 
the patient’s serious or life-threatening condition, no satisfactory alternative 
therapy is available, and the patient cannot receive the product through any 
existing clinical trials or expanded access protocols.34 
There are also ways to speed up the testing and review processes, such as 
“fast track” and “priority review” programs, that are specifically designed for a 
drug that has been “designated as a qualified infectious disease product.”35  “Fast 
track” designation is intended to bring the drug to market expeditiously and is set 
forth in Section 506(b) of the Act.36  The designation applies only for the specific 
use for which it is studied and the circumstances must satisfy the definition of 
“serious condition” laid out in Section III.A. in the Guidance.  Furthermore there 
must be an unmet medical need or a “condition whose treatment or diagnosis is 
not addressed adequately by available therapy”—for instance, a condition which 
 
life-threatening diseases or conditions who lack other therapeutic options and who may benefit from such 
therapies.”). 
31 KANE & SINGER, supra note 2, § 39:15. 
32 Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, supra note 22. 
33 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT 
USE 13 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ 
ucm351261.pdf.  
34 Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, supra note 22. 
35 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR THE INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR 
SERIOUS CONDITIONS-DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 7 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidance 
complianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm358301.pdf. 
36 Id. at 9 (Section 506(b) provides for the designation of “fast track product . . . if it is intended, 
whether alone or in combination with one or more other drugs, for the treatment of a serious or life-
threatening disease or condition, and it demonstrates the potential to address unmet medical needs for such 
a disease or condition.”). 
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has no or limited available treatment.37  The “fast track” designation allows for 
frequent interaction with the FDA review board in order to assess the drug pre-
IND—at the end of Phase I, at the end of Phase II, and so on—to discuss not only 
the extent of safety and concerns but also other critical issues and points related to 
the study design.38  In addition, the product may at some point establish its ability 
to receive priority review and consideration of its marketing application before 
the sponsor of the drug—a company, research institution, or other organization 
that is responsible for developing the drug—has even submitted the complete 
application.39 
Priority review requires the FDA to take action on the marketing application 
within six months, as opposed to the usual ten months in standard review.40  The 
drug must be one that treats a serious condition and would provide “a significant 
improvement in safety and effectiveness” of the treatment, prevention, or 
diagnosis of a serious condition—as defined by the Guidance.41  Sponsors may 
use scientific data—other than data from clinical trials—to compare a marketed 
product with the investigational drug.  They may show:  superiority relating to 
either safety or effectiveness; the drug’s ability to effectively treat patients who 
are unable to tolerate, or whose disease failed to respond to, available therapy; or 
that the drug can be used effectively with other critical agents that cannot be 
combined with available therapy. 
Generally, “[c]ommunication with the [FDA] is a critical aspect of expedited 
programs”.42  Expedited programs, while arguably in the public interest, do put 
the onus on sponsors, requiring sponsors to prepare a commercial manufacturing 
program that can accommodate the demonstrated need and consumer demand so 
that the drug will be available—and be a quality product—at the time of approval.  
It is important to note as well that expedited programs do not immunize sponsors 
from performing the necessary clinical trials and being subject to clinical trial 
inspections by the FDA.43 
In a circumstance like the Ebola outbreak, the FDA is equipped with yet 
another exception.  According to Section 564 of the Act, the “FDA Commissioner 
may allow unapproved medical products or unapproved uses of approved medical 
products to be used in an emergency to diagnose, treat, or prevent serious or life-
threatening diseases or conditions caused by certain threat agents when there are 
no adequate, approved, and available alternatives.”44  The FDA Commissioner is 
 
37 Id. at 4. 
38 Id. at 9. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 25. 
41 Id. at 24. 
42 Id. at 25. 
43 Id. at 25–26. 
44 See Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/ucm182568.htm; see, e.g., Notice of 
Emergency Use Authorizations, 80 Fed. Reg. 32,140 (Jun. 5, 2015).  The recent FDA guidance letter 
explains that “medical products that may be considered for an EUA are those that ‘may be effective,’” and 
it explicitly notes that “the ‘may be effective’ standard for EUAs provides for a lower level of evidence 
than the ‘effectiveness’ standard that FDA uses for product approvals.”  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES: GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 7–8 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Emergency 
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only permitted to authorize an EUA during a declared emergency, which requires 
declarations from Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of Defense, or 
Secretary of Health and Human Services that there is a “heightened risk of attack” 
with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents.45  In satisfying the 
requirements of Section 564, the Commissioner and the FDA are required to 
assess the medical product’s potential effectiveness as well as the risks and 
benefits of allowing its use.  In doing so, the FDA can only make an assessment 
based on the information known at the time and the current state of scientific 
knowledge.46  The FDA evaluates not only domestic, but also foreign clinical trial 
data as well as animal trial data.  Furthermore, the FDA allows clinical experience 
other than that present in controlled trials to be considered “if the circumstances 
warrant.”47 When establishing a lack of adequate, approved, and available 
alternatives, a potentially successful alternative product may be deemed 
“unavailable” by the FDA if the available supply of the product is unable to meet 
the full demands of the emergency need.48  This is by far the most liberal way to 
gain access to experimental and unapproved drugs.  It is a significant departure 
from normal drug-approval procedures.  The FDA is essentially statutorily 
allowed to consider very little clinical information, and in doing so, it considers 
foreign clinical data that is not part of any normal review process conducted by 
the FDA.  These EUAs have been issued not only for Ebola, but also for other 
widespread diseases such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), 
Anthrax, and Avian Flu.49 
 
B. The Drug Approval Process Abroad: The EU 
 
Access to experimental treatment and investigational drugs is subject to 
regulation in the EU as well.  Similar to the act enabling the FDA, Directive 
2001/83/EC of the European Parliament requires that rules governing the 
production, distribution, and use of medicinal products must safeguard the public 
health while also promoting the development of the pharmaceutical industry and 
trade of medicinal products in the EU.50 
As for the regulation of pharmaceutical products in Europe, the EU has taken 
a more invested role in harmonizing drug regulations across Europe.  Directive 
65/65/EEC51 is the earliest measure taken by the EU to harmonize the safety and 
efficacy standards for medicinal products, requiring the Member States to enact 
laws prohibiting medicinal products from being marketed on their territories 
 
Preparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/MCMLegalRegulatoryandPolicyFramework/UC
M493627.pdf [hereinafter FDA 2017 GUIDANCE LETTER] (emphasis added) 
45 FDA 2017 GUIDANCE LETTER, supra note 44, at 5–6. 
46 Id. (“FDA expects to interpret safety information in light of the seriousness of the clinical 
condition, alternative therapies (if any), and the specific circumstances of the emergency.”). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Emergency Use Authorization, supra note 44. 
50 Directive 2001/83 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the 
Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67. 
51 Council Directive 65/65 of 26 January 1965 on the Approximation of Provisions Laid Down by 
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action Relating to Medicinal Products, 1965 O.J. (L 22) 369. 
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without approval.52  Despite ever-increasing harmonization, approval of new 
pharmaceutical products is largely left up to national authorities.53  The EMA is 
an agency of the EU responsible for what is called the “centralized procedure” for 
drug authorization in the EU.54  The centralized procedure, which provides EU 
approval of most newly developed drugs given their “high-technology,” allows 
product access to several markets simultaneously and provides for time 
constraints on administrative structures that speed up the time it takes these 
products to go to market.55 
Exemptions from normal authorization or approval procedures are also 
available in the EU.  For products that are eligible for authorization under the 
centralized procedure, Article 83 of Regulation 726/2004 provides a legal 
framework for compassionate use in the EU.56  As the Article states, “by way of 
exemption from Article 6 of Directive 2001/83/EC, Member States may make a 
medicinal product for human use belonging to the categories referred to in Article 
3(1) and 3(2) of this Regulation available for compassionate use.”57  Under a 
compassionate use program implemented by a Member State, a medicinal product 
may be available to “patients with a chronically or seriously debilitating disease 
or whose disease is considered to be life threatening disease, and who cannot be 
treated satisfactorily by an authorized medicinal product.” 58  The medicinal 
product must either be the subject of a marketing authorization application or 
undergoing clinical trials.59  There are two major types of compassionate use 
programs:  named patient compassionate use programs and cohort compassionate 
use programs.60  Whereas named patient programs are initiated by physicians on 
behalf of individual patients, the manufacturer predefines the cohort programs to 
allow a group of patients to access an unauthorized product.61  At the same time, 
it should be remembered that compassionate use, as the EMA emphasizes, is not a 
substitute for properly conducted trials.62 
Compassionate use programs are coordinated and established through 
national legislation of member states who decide how and when to open these 
programs.63  Physicians who wish to obtain unauthorized products that seem 
promising for the treatment of their patients must contact the national authorities 
 
52 See TAMARA K. HERVEY & JEAN V. MCHALE, HEALTH LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 285 
(William Twinning & Christopher McGrudden eds., 2004). 
53 Id. at 289. 
54 Id. at 294. 
55 Id. 
56 Regulation 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
Laying Down Community Procedures for the Authorization and Supervision of Medicinal Product for 
Human and Veterinary Use and Establishing a European Medicines Agency, 2004 O.J. (L 135) 1. 
57 Id. at 65; see EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, GUIDELINE ON COMPASSIONATE USE OF MEDICINAL 
PRODUCTS, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 83 OF REGULATION (EC) NO 726/2004, 3 (2006), 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Regulatory_and_procedural_guideline/2009/10/
WC500004075.pdf. 
58 Regulation 726/2004, supra note 56, at 65. 
59 Id.; see EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 57, at 4. 
60 See id. at 3. 
61 Id. at 4. 
62 See id. 
63 EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE COMPASSIONATE USE OF MEDICINES IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2010), http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2010/01/ 
WC500069898.pdf. 
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and follow the requisite procedures.64  The EMA is responsible for providing 
recommendations that neither replace national legislation nor provide a legal 
framework but help to provide ways to administer, distribute, and use certain 
medicines for compassionate use with the overall goal of standardizing 
compassionate use programs throughout Europe.65  A limited number of 
compassionate use programs are actually endorsed by the EMA.66 
Expanded Access Programs allow physicians and patients to have access to 
medicines that are either unauthorized—approved by the EMA but not yet 
commercially available in Europe—or that are approved outside of the European 
Economic Area.67  Other alternatives to compassionate use programs under 
Article 83—and Articles 3(1) and 3(2)—of Regulation 726/2004 include “named-
patient basis” and “expanded access programs.”  Named-patient basis programs 
are similar to treatment INDs in the U.S.  Physicians contact the drug 
manufacturer directly for a medicinal product, which will be given to a patient 
under their direct care.68  “‘Named-patient basis’ . . . should not be confused with 
compassionate use [programs].”69  Under Article 5 of Directive 2001/83, a legal 
basis is set forth for pre-launched medicines.70  It provides an exception to the 
general rule that medicines must be approved before use or must be used during 
an approved clinical trial.  Although Article 5 does not detail the conditions for 
authorization, the Article is intended to give the Member States the authority to 
allow exceptions to the general rule.  Treatment on a named-patient basis involves 
physicians obtaining medicines for their patients directly from the drug 
manufacturer.71  Therefore, it requires that physicians bear the sole responsibility 
for the treatment of their patients.  Expanded access programs provide another 
avenue to early access to medicines directly from the drug manufacturer.72  
Patients who have received a medicine during a clinical trial and have benefitted 
from the treatment may continue treatment through an expanded access program 
authorized by the national authority.73  “It should be recognised that all medicines 
whether supplied via compassionate use or expanded access [programs] or as a 
‘named patient’ supply are unlicensed medicines, and therefore information on 
their safety and efficacy may in some cases be limited to early phase clinical 
trials.”74 
Throughout Europe generally, individual member states have nationalized 




66 See generally NHS GREATER GLASGOW & CLYDE, POLICIES RELATING TO THE MANAGEMENT OF 
MEDICINES, 1–27 (2010), http://ggcprescribing.org.uk/media/uploads/policies/section_9/9.1_ulm_policy_-
_1105.pdf.  
67 See D. URBINATI ET AL., EARLY ACCESS PROGRAMMES (EAPS): REVIEW OF EUROPEAN SYSTEM 
(Nov. 3–7, 2012), http://www.creativ-ceutical.com/sites/default/files/Early%20Access%20Programmes_ 
EU%20countries.pdf. 
68 EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 63, at 2. 
69 Id. at 2–3. 
70 Directive 2001/83, supra note 50, at 18. 
71 EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 63, at 3. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
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medicines.75  Despite harmonized regulations such as Regulation 726/2004/EC, 
“regulations differ widely among analyzed countries, due to differences in 
national medical practices, resources available, product funding, hospital 
structures and national insurance systems.”76  National regulations will differ 
based on the eligibility requirements, procedural elements, and review times.77  
Furthermore, there are many member states that have not put an expanded access 
program in place and have instead relied on compassionate use programs alone.  
Germany, for example, implements a “Hardship Case Program” through which a 
group of patients are able to gain access to medicines that have not yet been 
approved.78 
Compassionate use programs were introduced in Germany as part of an 
amendment to the German Medicines Act in 200979—an example of another legal 
exception to the traditional approval process.  Generally, medicines are governed 
by the Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel Medizinprodukte [the Federal Institute for 
Drugs and Medical Devices].80  The German Medicines Act dictates that 
medicinal products are exempt from marketing authorization if they are meant for 
treatment of diseases that are life-threatening or result in severe disabilities, and 
cannot be treated satisfactorily with any approved product.81  Prior to 2009, 
German law authorized the use of unapproved medicinal products only to the 
extent it qualified as a “justifiable emergencies” under the criminal code.82  This 
changed with the Fifteenth Amendment to the German Medicines Act that 
outlined additional requirements, including patient informed consent and securing 
approval from the proficient authority.83  According to Drug Hardship Ordinance 
of 2010, a compassionate use program will allow unauthorized medicinal 
products to be accessible to a group of patients if sufficient indications of efficacy 
and safety of the product exist and if a clinical trial is being conducted or an 
application for marketing authorization has been submitted to the EMA.84  Again, 
only patients suffering from diseases which result in death or severe disability are 
eligible to participate and only if other authorized products do not provide 
 
75 URBINATI ET AL., supra note 67. 
76 Id. 
77 EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, supra note 63, at 2. 
78 URBINATI ET AL., supra note 67. 
79 Arzneimittelgesetz [AMG] [Medicines Act], Aug. 24, 1976 BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL I] 
at 2445, as amended by Gesetz [G], July 17, 2009 BGBL I at 1990, art. 1 (Ger.). 
80 Kate Whitfield et al., Compassionate Use of Interventions: Results of a European Clinical 
Research Infrastructures Network (ECRIN) Survey of Ten European Countries, 11 TRIALS, no. 104, 2010, 




81 AMG BGBL I at 2445, § 21, no. 2, English translation available at http://www.pei.de/Shared 
Docs/Downloads/EN/111013-amg-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1; see Whiftfield et al., supra note 
80, at 5. 
82 See Lichtblick fur Austherapierte Patienten [Bright Spot for Out-Therapied Patients], PHARMA 
FAKTEN [PHARMA FACTS], https://www.pharma-fakten.de/fakten-hintergruende/innovationen-erfolge/ 
compassionate-use/ (last visited April 25, 2017). 
83 Gesetz zur Änderung Arzneimittelrechtlicher und Anderer Vorschriften [Law on Amendments to 
Pharmaceutical and Other Provisions], July 17, 2009, BGBL I at 1990, art. 1 (Ger.); see Whiftfield et al., 
supra note 80, at 5. 
84 Verordnung Uber das Inverkehrbringen von Arzneimitteln ohne Genehmigung oder ohne 
Zulassung in Hartefallen [AMHV] [Drug Hardship Ordinance], July 14, 2010 BGBL. I at 935, ¶ 1 (Ger.). 
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satisfactory treatment for the disease.85  The Drug Hardship Ordinance also 
provides that the federal authority may object to patients’ participation in the 
program if the prerequisites for the implementation of the compassionate use 
program are not fulfilled or there are indications that the information submitted is 
incorrect or that the safe use of the medicinal product is not guaranteed.86 
Unlike in Germany, the use of unlicensed medicines on a “named patient 
basis” is a widely used practice in the U.K.87   
 
[B]ecause of the continually evolving area of oncology 
medicine, clinicians want to be able to prescribe outside this 
product license on a named patient basis—either an unlicensed 
drug or drugs unlicensed for specific indications if, in their 
professional opinion, they consider this to be the best option for 
a patient.88 
 
The responsible regulatory body, the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency, requires generally, under the Medicines Act of 1968, that all 
medicines have a marketing authorization or product license if they are 
manufactured or marketed in the U.K.89  The U.K. provides another example of a 
European regulatory regime.  There are three instances in the U.K. in which an 
unlicensed medicine may be prescribed.  The unlicensed medicine may be 
prescribed (1) for uses that are outside the license scope of the prescribed diseases 
or conditions, (2) if the product is one which has been specially mixed for an 
individual patient because that patient’s needs cannot be met by a licensed 
product, or (3) if the unlicensed product is either licensed in another country or is 
undergoing clinical trials.90 
Even unlicensed products appear to be highly controlled in their use.  
Hospital Pharmacy Quality Assurance departments assess any unlicensed 
medication before it is released and maintain any necessary recorded 
information.91  In addition, most unlicensed products are subject to approval by 
Drugs and Therapeutics Committees prior to when they are introduced on the 
hospital formulary.92  The U.K. provides compassionate use programs and 
expanded access programs as well.  Special need programs allow physicians to 
provide patients who suffer from severe conditions a medicinal product without 
market approval in the U.K.93  In addition, the Earlier Access to Medicine 
Scheme provides access to medicines that are particularly promising and have a 
clearly positive risk-benefit balance.94  This scheme typically provides access 
 
85 Id. § 2. 
86 Id. § 4. 
87 See generally Siobhan Andrews, Named Patient Medicines: A Pharmacist’s Perspective, 1 
ONCOLOGY NEWS Issue 3, 10 (2006). 
88 Id. at 10. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 10–11. 
91 Id. at 11. 
92 Id. 
93 URBINATI ET AL., supra note 67. 
94 Off. of Life Sci., Early Access to Medicine Schemes (EAMS): Task Group and Principles, GOV.UK 
(May 10, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/early-access-to-medicines-scheme-eams-
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between the end of phase III trials and licensing.95  A regional division of the 
U.K. National Health Service provides guidelines for providing access to 
unlicensed products outside of clinical trials.  These guidelines require prescribers 
to believe the product will be favorable for the patient, obtain the patient’s 
consent before treatment, and explain to patients that the medicine is unlicensed.96  
The U.K. provides for the ethical review of compassionate use by the clinical 
ethics committee as well. 97  In addition, treatment in clinical trials will be 
extended to the patient at the trial’s conclusion if the participant is benefitting 
from the device or product under expanded access.98 
As the spread of a life-threatening disease like Ebola becomes a world-wide 
public health crisis, the EMA as well as the WHO, like the FDA, have emergency 
use procedures in place to accelerate access to unauthorized medical products.99 
The EMA provides for conditional approval of products, despite limited data, in 
emergencies.100  Under Decision 2119/98/EC of the European Parliament, 
member states are also urged in public health emergencies to provide rapid 
communication with the Commission and “exchange relevant data and 
information immediately via the Community network,” thereby allowing more 
coordination than may otherwise exist between nations.101  The EMA is also 
equipped to accelerate the availability and use of high-quality medicines by their 
rapid scientific advice protocol.  The Agency will provide the drug manufacturers 
advice on appropriate tests and studies to use in developing a medicine.  This 
prevents objections from popping up later when the drug is evaluated for 
marketing authorization.102  In the case of a rare disease, protocol assistance 
allows the EMA to answer questions specific to a designated orphan medicine.  
Orphan designation is a tool used by the EMA to incentivize the development of 
drugs for those diseases that are more rare, affect a smaller population, and that 
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often is not financially “worth it” for drug companies to produce medicines for.103 
Similarly, WHO reviews three criteria before allowing the use of unapproved 
products in an emergency: 
 
1. Review of technical documentation relating to safety and performance (for  
example, analytical and clinical evidence, stability data); 
2. Review of the documentation relating to the manufacture of the product  
and the manufacturer’s quality management system (QMS);  
3. An independent laboratory evaluation coordinated by WHO of the  
product’s performance and operational characteristics.104 
 
It seems by the language of these procedures that both the emergency 
procedure in place at the EMA and the procedure put in place by the WHO 
provide for more information about the sponsor of the drug and the drug itself 
than the emergency exception given to the FDA by law.  The EMA emergency 
protocols focus on coordination and more of a priority review type action as 
compared to the FDA, which by law is granted the ability to “bend” all of its 
existing rules and procedures. 
 
 
II. THE DEBATE 
 
 
 The essential issue, and the reason why this debate might never have a 
conclusion, is that our humanitarian instinct and the autonomy of patients as 
individuals to maximize their ability to thrive and seek health are at odds with, for 
instance, the ultimate mission of regulatory bodies such as the FDA which is 
mandated to promote the common good in public health.  “Currently, the U.S. has 
the safest, most effective vaccine supply in its history” and that is certainly not 
something the country achieved alone.105  The FDA holds as its mission the 
promotion and protection of public health.  “The safety of the U.S. drug supply 
contributes to the nation’s health, and FDA is the agency responsible for ensuring 
this safety.”106  Among its obligations in accomplishing its mission, the FDA 
 
103 See Orphan Designation, EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl= 
pages/regulation/general/general_content_000029.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac05800240ce (last visited Apr. 25, 
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benefit from incentives such as protection from competition once on the market.”  To qualify for orphan 
designation, a medicine must meet a number of criteria: it must be intended for the treatment, prevention or 
diagnosis of a disease that is life-threatening or chronically debilitating; the prevalence of the condition in 
the EU must not be more than 5 in 10,000 or it must be unlikely that marketing of the medicine would 
generate sufficient returns to justify the investment needed for its development; no satisfactory method of 
diagnosis, prevention or treatment of the condition concerned can be authorized, or, if such a method exists, 
the medicine must be of significant benefit to those affected by the condition.). 
104 Mezher, supra note 99; see also Emergency Use Assessment and Listing (EUAL) Procedure for 
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en/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2017). 
105 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ENSURING THE SAFETY OF VACCINES IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2011). 
106 COMMITTEE ON ETHICAL & SCI. ISSUES IN STUDYING THE SAFETY OF APPROVED DRUGS, ETHICAL 
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focuses on three key aspects to promote and protect public health:  assuring the 
safety and effectiveness of vaccines and other biological products, helping to be a 
catalyst for product innovations, and giving the public accurate and science-based 
information so that they use medicines to improve health.107 
 On the other hand, a prominent ethical argument in favor of expanded access, 
for example, promotes the idea that “patients should have a right to mitigate 
extreme suffering and to enhance self-preservation. . . . [A]s rational actors, 
patients are presumed to be capable of making well-informed treatment decisions 
in consultation with their physicians.”108  Without regard to the long-term 
negative effects of increased expanded access—such as delays in drug 
development, approval, and participation in preapproved clinical trials—patients 
at risk of terminal illnesses often advocate for the right to be able to utilize their 
own risk-benefit calculus and make their own treatment decisions that they deem 
appropriate.  Many critics have issues with such a stance, since studies showing 
that informational asymmetries lead to patient vulnerability along with the 
public’s risk comprehension being low.109  And these two shortcomings 
demonstrate just a couple of the risks in increasing expanded access.  
Despite the established existence of exceptions to the normal drug approval 
process that clearly exist—not just in the U.S., but also around the world—the 
practice is not blindly accepted.  The debate over experimental drugs and the 
efficacy of the FDA’s new drug approval process is not a new one.  In fact, much 
of the tension and concerns in the context of recent public health crises like Ebola 
were raised in the context of AIDS treatment and cancer treatment over the last 
twenty to thirty years as well.  It comes down to what has been described as a 
“utilitarian calculus” or “an attempt to balance competing social interests.” 110  
There is a tension between “new drug development hold[ing] out the promise of 
innovative treatments for debilitating disease, for extending the human life span, 
and for relief of suffering . . .” and “[o]n the other hand, the introduction of 
inadequately tested new drugs creat[ing] the risk of iatrogenic injuries through 
toxic side effects, carcinogenicity, et cetera.”111  Tension exists between the push 
for improved access to new treatments and the FDA’s responsibility to ensure and 
maintain the safety and effectiveness of new drugs.112  Activists continue to 
confront the inevitable conundrum of wanting both safe and effective drugs while 
also criticizing the regulation of an industry that cannot possibly satisfy all 
competing interests at once.  Even when the FDA is more willing to risk making 
new drugs available even if they later prove ineffective or unsafe, activists still 
claim that the FDA has not gone far enough.113 
 The adequate balance of interests, risks, and benefits becomes all too 
complicated in the context of public health crises like AIDS.  Similar to the Ebola 
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crisis of 2014, the AIDS crisis erupted in the context of what many believe was 
conservative regulation over new drugs absent any existing approved treatment in 
the U.S.114  Criticism soared as frustrated, terminally ill patients saw those same 
treatments rejected in the U.S. but approved in several countries abroad.115  As 
Anne Wells wrote, 
 
AIDS constitutes a worldwide epidemic of an entirely new, 
infectious, and as of today, inevitably fatal disease unlike any 
faced in modern history.  Because of the unique nature of the 
challenge that AIDS presents, the current “business as usual” 
approach taken by the federal government and the FDA is 
inadequate.  FDA administrative regulations have overdeveloped 
to the point where they actually harm those that they were 
designed to protect.116 
 
Critics, especially terminally ill patients suffering from fatal diseases like AIDS, 
consider the FDA’s process as a means of “sacrific[ing] today’s AIDS patients in 
order to save tomorrow’s patients.”117  Of course to a patient with no other 
alternative other than an unapproved, experimental alternative, the choice is 
simple.  The risks involved behind clinical trials using placebos and needing 
supporting evidence to show that the treatment is in fact safe and effective simply 
become irrelevant.118  Instead, the FDA’s gatekeeping measures and 
precautionary, protective responses are simply a “death sentence.”119 
The problem, however, is that terminally ill patients come to quite a different 
risk-benefit calculation than the general public.120  “[T]he issue becomes whether 
it is ethical for the FDA to place greater emphasis on its long term regulatory 
needs than on the immediate needs of individual patients.”121  The court in recent 
years implicitly spoke to this issue when it ruled in Abigail Alliance v. Von 
Eschenbach that there is in fact no fundamental right to try experimental drugs,122 
effectively preventing terminally ill patients from constitutionally overriding the 
place of the FDA.  In a suit against the FDA Commissioner and the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services, patients sought to enjoin the FDA 
from preventing the distribution of drugs that had passed Phase I of the approval 
process to terminally ill patients.123  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit ruled against Abigail Alliance, holding that terminally ill 
patients do not have a constitutional right to unapproved drugs and that it was not 
a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.124  Since the Supreme 
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Court denied certiorari in 2008, the constitutional answer to the ethical question 
of whether the FDA may place greater emphasis on its long-term regulatory needs 
than on the immediate needs of individual patients ethical question is a 
resounding “yes.” 
Much of the criticism of the FDA is based off of observations regarding drug 
approval processes in European countries. Concerns have been raised throughout 
history with regard to the prevalent “American drug lag,” pressuring the FDA to 
change its regulations to look more like its European counterparts and to 
incorporate foreign clinical data in order to speed up the FDA’s approval 
process.125  All of the criticism and pressure continues today despite the fact that 
the EU considers the FDA to be the “gold standard approval body.”126 
Yet the situation is far too complex for patients to comprehend, and it seems 
that criticism of the FDA is somewhat unfounded.  Several scholars have 
questioned the ability of critics to even compare the FDA’s approval process to its 
European counterpart.127  In a recent study, oncology journals attempted to 
compare FDA and EMA approval efficacies and did not come away with any 
answers as to why these agencies are capable of arriving at different approval 
outcomes for the same drug, with the same data and clinical trials.128  If anything, 
the European drug approval process has become more legalistic and seems to 
many, over time, to be more cumbersome than the FDA process since it involves 
both a central agency and individual member states.129  Furthermore, the FDA and 
EMA simply have a different focus in their respective approval processes.  “The 
FDA continues to place its focus on the manufacturing facilities—much more so 
than do the European authorities.  The EU instead places its focus on process 
control analysis.”130 
In a recent study of the differences in approval outcomes concerning the 
exact same drugs, it was clear that “[m]ost if not all of the differences in 
authori[zations] . . . are not about drugs with clear efficacy benefits compared 
with risk, but concern agents where there is highly complex detail about narrow 
therapeutic margins between benefit and harm.”131  In the end, drug approval is a 
matter of different value judgments and interpretations—of the proper level of 
risk and benefit—by human beings from different cultures and in the context of 
not only the interests of patients, but of political pressures and moral 
conclusions.132  Overall, it is not a blanket conclusion that European drug 
approvals take significantly less time than those in the U.S., nor can it be said that 
FDA approval requirements are more inflexible and leave struggling patients with 
less access to experimental treatment than existing European requirements.  As 
Beishon iterates, “[d]ifferences can also arise because of timing and the options 
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open to the regulator, in particular the FDA, which is often the first to receive an 
application for a drug, and also tends to implement more fast-track and 
conditional procedures than the EMA.”133  RAPS also points out that in 2013 
alone the FDA surpassed the EMA in approving new molecular entitiesl,134 or 
“first in-world approvals.”135 
In the end, it must be recognized that because the FDA’s mission is to 
promote and protect public health, the FDA and the U.S. generally play a role in 
developing new vaccines which has been recognized as among the many global 
public goods.  Americans do, and should, care about global development in the 
arena of health because in recent times the U.S. has been at the forefront of 
research and development in efforts to eradicate disease and epidemics, despite 
criticism.  Its efforts with global partners have spurred much of the important 
progress in vaccine development. 
 
U.S. resources and research and technical capacity committed to 
health are unparalleled.  Total U.S. public spending on medical 
research and development equals that of all other nations 
combined.  Over many decades, a good proportion of this 
spending has gone toward the prevention and control of diseases 
most prevalent in developing countries.  Scientists at the 
publicly funded National Institutes of Health (NIH) helped 
develop antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV/AIDS and to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission during birth, saving lives at home 
and across the developing world.  The NIH’s Vaccine Research 
Center is at the forefront of developing new vaccines for some 
of the most dangerous diseases, such as swine flu and Ebola.  
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) leads 
efforts to monitor, isolate, and treat infectious diseases, 
protecting the health of Americans as well as people around the 
globe.136 
 
Furthermore, while it is difficult to accept, patients must understand that the 
proper balance—between government regulation and personal autonomy, 
between regulation of new drugs and the degree of accepted experimentation, and 
between satisfying the needs of pharmaceutical companies with the means to 
control the development of new treatments and the safety of consumers—is a 
balance that may never be perfectly struck regardless of changes to existing 
regulation.137  As Michael Greenberg explains in the context of the AIDS crisis, 
 
On the one hand, for people confronting sickness and death from 
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AIDS-related illnesses that remain refractory to treatment with 
current medications, the pace of new drug development is still 
too slow, even given FDA efforts to cut years from the 
development time in the new drug pipeline.   On the other hand, 
even some AIDS activists have questioned whether the FDA has 
gone too far in abbreviating the new drug development process, 
and whether the FDA has compromised traditional safety and 
efficacy standards in the effort to make experimental drugs more 
widely and more rapidly available.138 
 
The solutions may very well have nothing to do with increased rights and access 
to experimental medicines and treatments.  Over time, there has been a consistent 
request for additional funding for the FDA.  There is a prominent complaint that 
the FDA is being asked to produce a number of approvals and results that are 
simply impossible to fulfill at an understaffed, underfunded government 
regulatory body.139 
Notably, this debate deals not only with the rights of patients—as tends to be 
the main focus—but also ties directly to the rationale behind clinical trials and 
related ethical questions, as well as residual effects that may not be apparent at 
the onset.140  For instance, many critics—such as Dr. Krim of the American 
Foundation for AIDS research—argue that the use of placebos in clinical testing 
to be “inhumane”; especially when such a fatal disease leaves patients without an 
opportunity to live if not given treatment.141  Yet, there are plenty of experimental 
treatments that, without proper clinical trials, will remain ineffective.  For 
example, placebo-control and randomization are indispensable for research and 
the furthering of future treatments that could actually eradicate grave illnesses.142 
In addition, the push for earlier and increased access to experimental 
medicines outside of clinical trials has not only led to truncations of the trial 
process, but has also led to the postponement of research that would otherwise 
have been done in the absence of increased access.  These changes risk degrading 
the quality of information-gathering as well as “sabotaging” the process itself.143  
Additionally, changing regulations to be more accommodating to the terminally 
ill patients will predictably do more than simply affect access to medicines.144  
Only prioritizing the interests of terminally ill patients at the expense of clinical 
research and the proper, safe development of new treatments and medicines “may 
lead to an equilibrium in which everyone is worse-off.  If formal clinical trials 
genuinely do develop information that is otherwise impossible to obtain, then 
efforts to improve individual welfare by degrading the research process may 
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ultimately prove to be self-defeating gestures.”145  It is the unfortunate reality that 
the effects of drugs cannot be discovered or known beforehand. 
It is all too easy to forget the astounding negative and extensive effects that 
could ensue in either of two extreme circumstances:  a world with complete 
patient autonomy and ability to access experimental treatments without regulatory 
interference, or a world—as once existed before the FDA expanded the options 
for earlier access to unapproved medicines—where no medicine could be 
accessed without FDA approval and full clinical testing.  A world with complete 
patient autonomy, like the one advocated for by AIDS activists where patients 
would choose for themselves what risks were worth taking and the regulatory 
bureaucracy, is not the answer but rather potentially the fastest route in the race to 
the bottom: 
 
[The] extreme of a completely unregulated market has 
potentially negative consequences for commercial development, 
despite the prospect of superficial autonomy enhancement in a 
world free from FDA interference.  Exactly how manufacturers 
would respond to an unregulated marketplace is unclear; but, 
given the costs of advertising compared to clinical trial research, 
it seems plausible that competition might favor reduced research 
and increased directed marketing, especially in the absence of 
any government imposed standards for proof of new drug safety 
and efficacy.146 
 
Nevertheless, we continue to be confronted in the wake of the Ebola crisis 
with the same cycle that has been responsible for increased flexibility in the 
FDA’s regulation of new drugs and a complete change in approach the FDA has 
fostered in recent years:  a disease without an existing treatment; a significant 
portion of the globe’s population becoming infected with the disease; proof of the 
disease’s tragic fatality rate; an ensuing public health crisis; increased patient 
frustration and political activism; and the resulting liberalization of access to new, 
experimental drugs and treatments that continues to move the FDA away from 
protecting consumers from the effects of unapproved treatments at too early a 
stage and toward a regulatory world that bows to the demands of patients.  The 
FDA, in response to the AIDS crisis and criticism from innumerable AIDS 
patients, created many of the exceptions that now exist, including:  expanded 
access; parallel tracking; fast tracking; and treatment and compassionate use 
exemptions, among others.  That is now the world post-Ebola as well. 
We are left with the ultimate questions:  is over-regulation of drug approval 
and the use of experimental drugs actually possible?  Or has the FDA gone too far 
in compromising safety and efficacy standards but continuously creating 
loopholes to the access of unapproved treatments?  Does this age-old debate 
really leave us without any alternative but to dwindle down FDA regulation and 
the agency’s mission to nothing, to satisfy the interests of patients?  If the FDA 
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does stay its course, does this really mean that thousands upon thousands of 
terminally ill patients are “sentenced to death?” 
 
 
III. EBOLA: A HEALTH CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 
 
 
For the third time since 2007, our world was faced with a public health 
emergency. Officially declaring an emergency of international concern on August 
8, 2014, the WHO changed the legal ramifications of doctors’ and countries’ 
activities and sparked debates of infinite proportions.147  When emergency laws 
are set in place, they provide legal powers, options, and flexibility; but without 
guidance, clarity, or set ways to utilize this flexibility to provide the best legal 
response for the particular situation.148  This was the legal environment in which 
doctors and regulatory bodies decided to bypass regulatory normalcy and engage 
in the use of experimental drugs as well as the review of drugs in the regulatory 
process without sufficient scientific information. 
The FDA worked to use all of its authorities and response mechanisms to 
deal with the world’s first Ebola epidemic by facilitating access to products.149  It 
created an Ebola Task Force across the various divisions of the FDA, worked 
with global entities to exchange information and provide orphan designation to 
certain medicinal products, and used its power under the Emergency Use 
Authorization to make products available that were not on the traditional 
regulatory track.150  The agency worked, and continues to work as we see from 
the announcement of a new Ebola vaccine,151 with medical product sponsors and 
other U.S. government agencies to clarify regulatory requirements, provide risk-
benefit assessments, gather scientific data, and develop agreements for “further 
development and availability of medical countermeasures.”152 
Beginning in September 2014, international regulators agreed to work 
together cooperatively in the fight against Ebola.153  The EMA worked in parallel 
with the WHO to efficiently and expediently help to bring drugs to market that 
would provide treatment to the thousands of emerging Ebola cases.  Specifically, 
the EMA’s efforts consisted of assigning “orphan designation”154 to certain 
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medications and providing “rapid scientific advice”155 to certain companies, such 
as GlaxoSmithKline.156  Both the EMA and FDA often work to exchange 
information regarding applications they had received as well as the assessment of 
the respective applications.157  Additionally, the EMA—on its own and in 
collaboration with the European pharmaceutical industry and the EU generally—
launched a multi-million euro program to collaborate with experts and regulators 
to confront the unique challenges of Ebola and related disease research.158 
In addition to the individual responses of the FDA and the EMA, the WHO 
and its ethics panel—made up of researchers, ethicists, and patient safety 
advocates—came to unanimous agreement that in the “special circumstances of 
this Ebola outbreak it is ethical to offer unregistered treatments.”159  In other 
words, the WHO decided that offering unregistered treatments is ethical, despite 
the unknown efficacy of such drugs or the unknown adverse effects of these 
medications, to use such treatments to cure or prevent the disease in victims.160  It 
may be hard to argue against such a declaration since multiple sources call the 
outbreak in 2014 the largest Ebola outbreak on record.161  Depending on the 
country reporting, the death rate varied between 28–61%.162  At one point, the 
WHO reported an overall death rate of 41%.163  The epidemic was responsible for 
the death of over 11,000 people and the infection of 30,000 people.164  “Crisis 
mode” amped up when President Obama announced his intention in September 
2014 to deploy three thousand military personnel and contribute 750 million 
dollars to the effort to eradicate the disease.165  To most people, it seemed like 
desperate times called for desperate measures.  The flexibility provided by the 
emergency legal regime, prompted by the WHO’s and President Obama’s 
declaration of an international health emergency, aided the FDA and WHO in 
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A. Ethical Considerations Revisited 
 
Again, it is important to pause and observe the environment in which these 
“life or death decisions” were made.  In a climate of fear and desperation, 
decisions were made, experimental drugs were provided, and ethical and legal 
debates—and their consequences—ensued, continuing to trouble ethics and 
scientific experts today, even after the announcement of an efficacious Ebola 
vaccine in the making.  As Acting Chief Scientist at the FDA, Luciana Borio 
explained that in times of public health emergencies and crises 
 
we humans have a very difficult time with the idea that when we 
are faced with a serious illness that we may not get a test drug 
that could potentially help . . . often not considering the potential 
harm. . . . Fear tends to prevail over logic but this very 
understandable human reaction is not in our best individual or 
common interest and that’s because most drugs that enter human 
clinical trials are not proven safe and effective . . . .166 
 
Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives that ZMapp was administered to several Ebola patients for the 
first time as an experimental treatment—even though it was impossible to 
determine at the time whether the treatment was safe or effective.167  
Additionally, he referenced the work being done at that time—not in advance of 
using the experimental treatment—to advance testing to determine whether the 
medication was in fact safe or effective.168  Chief Scientist Luciana Borio also 
availed the lack of credible scientific information for these experimental 
treatments when she too testified in front of the Committee, noting above all that 
 
[t]he investigational vaccines and treatments for Ebola are in the 
earliest stages of development and have not been tested for 
safety or effectiveness in humans.  Currently, there are only 
small amounts of some experimental products that have been 
manufactured for testing.  This constrains our options for both 
properly assessing safety and efficacy of these investigational 
products in and making material available for therapeutic use 
outside of, a clinical trial (also known as expanded access) to 
respond to the epidemic.169 
 
What may seem simply like a desperate measure for a desperate time sparked the 
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ethical and scientific debate that has ensued since the crisis about the appropriate 
use of experimental drugs.  As Hodge reminded the regulatory community, 
“[u]nleashing a harmful experimental drug (or vaccine) on populations facing the 
threat of Ebola may result in a legal and ethical firestorm, even if such harms 
were unperceived or unintended.”170 
Ethical considerations in this kind of public health crisis are two-fold.  First, 
there is the continuing question even in times of normalcy as to whether 
experimental treatments should be given outside of clinical trials.  Second, there 
is the question of whether it is feasible to allow humans to receive experimental 
treatments when clinical trials are beyond difficult to develop and lack of a 
controlled method of delivering the treatment could lead to disaster.  These two 
questions incorporate the same balance of interests that have plagued the criticism 
of the FDA throughout the past thirty years.  It is hard to argue against those who 
advocated to provide ZMapp and other experimental drugs to those dying from 
the Ebola virus—despite the lack of scientific information and knowledge of the 
risks.  It is a natural human reaction to save those who are facing death rather than 
to allow their health to diminish.  It, however, is still imperative that physicians 
and health care workers do so responsibly and with the help of regulation. 
It is not the idea of conducting clinical trials or providing care to those facing 
an epidemic—or even curbing rules in times of emergency—with which scholars 
of all backgrounds take issue.  The FDA’s Committee on Ethical and Scientific 
Issues in Studying the Safety of Approved Drugs noted, 
 
[a] trial in which the risks to participants are not outweighed by 
the prospect of direct medical benefits to participants may be 
justifiable if a question of pressing public health importance 
cannot be properly answered without the conduct of the trial and 
if other conditions intended to safeguard the rights and interests 
of participants are satisfied.171 
 
Clearly the FDA has rationalized instances in which trials are necessarily 
conducted if the public health importance requires it.  Rather, it is the extent to 
which those rules are curbed and the abandonment of law’s delegation in times of 
emergency that unnerves those who have been part of the academic dialogue.  As 
explained in Section I, the FDA has empowered itself in times of health crises to 
make decisions based on extremely little information.  The FDA has been 
pressured time and time again to loosen its regulatory grip on the drug approval 
process.  The FDA has been bullied into continuing to offer more increased 
access to medicines in times when the FDA would normally take years to 
adequately assess the drug’s safety and effectiveness, as mandated by law.  When 
will patients be satisfied with the FDA’s role in controlling access to medicine?  
There will come a time where exceptions will outgrow the rules, when the FDA’s 
role is moot and no longer provides what it has been mandated to do by law:  
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develop safe and effective new medicines.  This trend is not only detrimental in 
normal times but it is also threatening in times of public health emergency as 
demonstrated by points made throughout the debate on compassionate use during 
the Ebola outbreak. 
As the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
testified before Congress, “[i]t is important to balance the urgency to deploy 
investigational medical countermeasures in an emergency such as the current 
Ebola outbreak with the need to ensure the maximal safety and to determine the 
efficacy of candidate drugs and vaccines for Ebola.”172  Yet, experimental drugs 
were employed impulsively with very little information on their safety and 
effectiveness, without any protocol to determine in such an emergency which 
scientific factors health officials were required to consider before use and which 
factors could wait to be discovered, and without any information as to side effects 
or pain.173  Moreover, critics pushed the FDA to review drug applications in a 
matter of days rather than in a matter of months or even years.174  The FDA has 
admitted to “bending” its rules in order to deal with the crisis, leaving some 
critics to wonder how safe their decisions actually were.175  It begs the question of 
whether the FDA would have been able to pursue the same course of action if the 
crisis had happened in the U.S.176 
The issues with using experimental treatment in emergency situations such as 
Ebola continue to compound.  Aside from the issues within the regulatory body’s 
decision making, there is simply a lack of information on the ground to best 
evaluate risks and benefits to patients.  
 
Triage in scarce, established treatments is often possible when 
the natural history of the disease, medication effects, and status 
of the patient are taken into account.  Yet, with experimental 
treatments, few of these factors can be determined vis-à-vis the 
effect of the drug—one loses the ability to discern the patients 
likely to benefit.  With this inability to properly triage, the 
consequences of misuse may be 3-fold:  poorer outcomes for the 
“treated” severely ill population, missed opportunities for 
realistically treatable patients, and a possible induction of 
resistance that bears worse outcomes for future patients.177 
 
The drug-testing regulations put forth by the FDA are meant to define the safety 
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of new drugs’ use while also developing an adequate understanding of their 
nature before the average consumer may use them.  Yet, using experimental drugs 
bypasses these requirements; therefore, there is no evidence to support the drug’s 
use before human beings receive it.  It may be one thing to allow this practice in a 
controlled situation with physician approval, a complete evaluation of the 
patient’s illness and prognosis, and a discussion of available options—as takes 
place under normal compassionate use or expanded access procedures.  Imagine 
employing such a practice on a widespread scale in the middle of an epidemic.178  
Patients do not get the information they need nor are they able to evaluate their 
situation properly to understand the risks and benefits to them and the society 
using these experimental treatments.  
 The concerns go beyond those of actually risking a patient’s health, however.  
There is agreement across the board that the gold standard in drug development is 
randomized and controlled clinical trials.  No expert would dispute the fact that to 
properly encourage safe and effective drug development, the drug approval 
process involving stages of clinical trials must be utilized.  In the case of Ebola, 
no existing treatment existed and the only alternatives were experimental drugs 
that had not yet gone through the drug approval process.  Regulators were only 
left with the choice to conduct clinical trials in the midst of the crisis in order to at 
least obtain information that could lead to drug approval and mitigation of the 
ongoing epidemic in the future.  
Even when a clinical trial is set up in the middle of an epidemic, there are 
practical issues that act as deterrents in certain circumstances from setting up 
clinical trials in a time of crisis.  As Foreign Affairs reports, “[r]outine health care 
had collapsed in all three affected countries, and even minor medical 
complications, in childbirth, car accidents, and simple falls, were proving 
lethal.”179  Advanced healthcare did not exist in the countries in which the disease 
was spreading and this will not be unique to the Ebola outbreak.  Additionally, 
the volunteer physicians were dealing with a population of patients with an 
entirely different culture and understanding of health-related concepts.  Issues 
with adequately informing patients about the disease and the experimental nature 
of the treatment ensue.  “[P]hysicians’ ability to meaningfully inform vulnerable 
populations is overestimated.  The belief that informed consent is understood by 
patients naive to advanced health care, especially in an epidemic, is cavalier.”180 
As a result, there is essentially no such thing as meaningful informed 
consent—the most important legal and ethical component of using experimental 
drugs.  First, a patient suffering from Ebola cannot possibly be able to rationally 
assess the benefits and risks associated with receiving the unapproved drug.  
Second, physicians operated, and operate in other outbreaks, in countries with 
very little resources where hundreds of cases erupt each day.  Imagine the chaos 
ensuing as physicians attempt to treat as quickly as possible, and the lack of 
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understanding and trust a patient must have in this dire situation.  Using 
experimental drugs is technically ethical, but that presupposes the ability to obtain 
informed consent and perform an evaluation of the risks and benefits to the 
patient, both of which could not adequately come to fruition in the Ebola 
epidemic and likely will not come to fruition in a future outbreak.181  Comparing 
this situation in the Ebola crisis to the four ultimate goals and requirements of the 
law enabling the FDA, there is no question that medical authorities were asked to 
do more than slightly “bend” the rules. 
The critical ethical dilemma that has been debated most often is:  who should 
receive the experimental drug that is only available in limited supply?  Critics 
took issue with the fact that two Americans received the doses as opposed to 
native African patients.182  There is not, and never will be, a right answer to this 
question.  So how should doctors deal with this question in increased magnitude 
when a clinical trial is supposed to have a control group?  “[H]ow can researchers 
justify a control group in the first place, given a mortality rate approaching 60 
percent?”183  Yet without such a controlled group and an actual clinical, 
randomized trial, patients who survive from the treatment do not actually tell us 
anything about the safety or efficacy of the medication.184  It is the unfortunate 
reality that using experimental drugs in an epidemic and “[a]llowing 
considerations of rescue rather than scientific hypotheses to drive use of novel 
agents . . . risks compromising the acquisition of knowledge needed to clarify 
their role in the next epidemic and ultimately to maximize benefits for 
patients.”185 
 
B. The Recent Results from the rVSV-ZEBOV Trial and the Lessons Learned 
 
The debate is no different after the release of a report in The Lancet that 
details the trial conducted by researchers on a new drug rVSV-ZEBOV at the 
latter half of the Ebola epidemic.  The vaccine and the trials leading up to this 
point have been praised, not only for their efficacy but also for the ethical 
consideration that prompted the design of the trial as well as its success.  A 
testament to the effectiveness of global collaboration, attention, and resources, the 
vaccine was tested using a ring vaccination strategy in “record time-just two 
years.”186  Because of the results, the vaccine awaits official approval by the FDA 
and the WHO in 2018.187  While the new vaccine presents an answer for future 
populations battling the horrific disease, many scientists are still hesitant to praise 
the work done during an epidemic.  Scientists wrote in The Lancet report that “[a] 
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devastating outbreak of Ebola virus disease is clearly not the ideal situation for 
doing a vaccine trial.”188 
In designing clinical trials—and particularly in emergency situations such as 
these—the same ethical questions and trade-offs continue to arise: 
 
Early scholars . . . clearly recognized that there was often an 
inherent trade-off between ethical requirements and scientific 
rigor.  The means to resolving the trade-off came not necessarily 
through insisting on validity over ethics, but rather in reaching 
consensus on what is at stake.  If a significant reduction in 
mortality might be gained from an experimental treatment, then 
health care providers need not be absolutely certain that it is 
highly effective before prescribing it . . . . In other situations, 
ethical and epistemic considerations may point in the same 
direction.189 
 
Scientists sought to responsibly wrestle with this trade-off when they 
designed the trial of rVSV-ZEBOV.  They chose what is called the “ring 
vaccination strategy”—the type of trial used to eradicate smallpox.  In so 
choosing, ethical considerations played an important role.  Ring vaccination is 
defined as follows:  an infection control measure that vaccinates clusters of 
individuals with the experimental treatment who are at high risk for disease 
infection based on their connection with a known case of a disease.190  The ring 
vaccination strategy was thought to be ethically superior to other trial designs, 
specifically because it entailed all participants receiving a dose of the treatment as 
opposed to placebo-controlled trials, in which a random group of individuals 
received a placebo instead.  The placebo approach is often ridiculed in a 
particular instance like an epidemic because it deprives a certain group of 
treatment.  Oftentimes there is risk for bias in choosing groups, which receive 
treatment as well.  Additionally, the ring vaccination strategy prioritized those 
candidates who were at the highest risk of contracting disease.  Randomization 
was also involved, as certain individuals received the vaccine after twenty-one 
days and others immediately.191  The trial team carefully planned and executed 
ways to ensure that participants were monitored, educated, and had consented 
prior to participation.  The study team gave infection prevention advice, created a 
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Guinean Ebola response team locally in the community, which was responsible 
for daily home visits, and conducted post-vaccination visits as well.192 
 Some officials, however, continue to be hesitant: 
 
The new vaccine is “a step in the right direction but not the 
ultimate solution” said Dr. Gary J. Nabel, chief scientific officer 
for global health research at the Sanofi pharmaceutical company 
. . . . A randomized clinical trial involving tens of thousands of 
subjects is the preferred way to test any vaccine, he noted.193 
 
It also still holds true that in communities like the one used for the trial, the sense 
of urgency that accompany any health crisis in addition to a lack of community 
education will increase risks of therapeutic misconceptions.194  Annette Rid and 
Franklin G. Miller also raise ethical concerns about the process.  They 
commented, “[t]he prevailing ethical confusion about the trial design raises 
concern that its broad acceptance rests on false beliefs and expectations.”195  
Aside from providing treatment that had only passed Phase I, and later Phase II, 
of clinical trials, Rid and Miller noted that though the study was praised for its 
alternative design from a placebo-controlled trial, the clusters which received 
delayed treatment were no better off than those that would have otherwise 
received a placebo.196  “Sponsors, investigators, and commentators tended to 
portray the trial as an ethically preferable alternative to a placebo-controlled trial 
without clearly acknowledging or downplaying the fact that it, too, withheld the 
study vaccine for a period of time.”197  Even scientists involved in the study 
admitted in The Lancet that “the healthcare system in Guinea was strained, 
potential trial participants were worried about a candidate vaccine made by 
foreign people, and the Ebola virus disease response teams were facing security 
issues.”198 
 The takeaway from this experience is, namely, that despite safeguards, 
experimental treatment and public health crises pose reoccurring issues in the 
quest for effective and safe medication.  There is a trade-off between scientific 
advancement and ethical perfection—between saving lives and ensuring an 
adequate clinical testing environment.  What this latest study shows is that with 
the right community collaboration, the right emphasis on ethical considerations, 
and the prioritization of those most at risk, there may be some prayer of coming 
to a point of compromise.199 
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Observing a public health crisis like Ebola requires us to think back to those 
ultimate questions:  does the regulatory process really give terminally ill patients 
a death sentence?  Can we ever resolve the natural tension between the interests 
of terminally ill patients who see their death imminently awaiting—without a 
cure—and the general population who has a significant interest in seeing the FDA 
drug approval process work for the future of drug development?  The Ebola 
outbreak shows the growing concerns with the use of experimental drugs and 
mandates the continuing presence of the FDA and a robust regulatory framework 
that demands safety and efficacy as well as increased information to patients, 
despite the costs. 
 
 
IV. THE FUTURE OF DRUG REGULATION 
 
 
 Although the Ebola epidemic resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and led 
the world to scramble to respond to a crisis it was wholly unprepared to deal 
with—much like the AIDS crisis—it has positively impacted the role of 
government agencies.  It has also shaped emergency preparedness and the ability 
of the U.S.—and the world—to adequately counter another public health 
emergency of its kind.  The Ebola epidemic has also been a catalyst for change 
and medical innovation.  “Ultimately, only the huge, explosive 2014 outbreak . . . 
provided the political and economic drive to make an effective vaccine.”200  Since 
the apex of the Ebola crisis, the FDA and its Commissioner, Luciana Borio, have 
also made an adamant push to provide more resources and information to 
advocate for clinical trials and the development of sufficient clinical trial designs.  
To this end, the FDA has been accepting input since December of 2015 on 
designing clinical trials in emerging infectious diseases.201  In the summer of 
2016, Merck announced its Breakthrough Therapy Designation from the FDA for 
the investigational Ebola Zaire Vaccine, which will expedite its development and 
review.202  The FDA has also published additional and updated guidance geared 
towards dealing with another potential Ebola outbreak.203  The 2014 Ebola crisis 
has sparked the creation of multiple training programs and educational 
opportunities for our hospital system and health care workers so that they may 
have the proper understanding of how to respond to such an infectious disease.204  
Additionally, protocols, including a single common clinical trial protocol, and 
other guidance materials have been created to streamline emergency responses 
 
engagement and individual consent.  Despite the challenges, our team was able to do the trial in compliance 
with good clinical practice and international standards. 
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and preparedness for the future.205  In February 2015, the FDA disclosed revisions 
to its process for compassionate use applications.206  The process will now only 
require one form and thirty days.  FDA officials may even grant expanded access 
over the phone.207  Generally, between the efforts of the FDA, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, and others, clinical trials have successfully been initiated and nearly 
completed, showing officially that with the help of these regulatory bodies, Ebola 
is in fact a survivable disease.208  The heads of these agencies have agreed that the 
U.S. is much safer and better prepared than it was before the crisis.209 
 Yet outside of the epidemic context and public health emergency context, 
terminally ill patients and other patients similarly situated criticize the FDA and 
advocate access to unproven medicines.  Despite the FDA approving 5,816 of the 
5,849 expanded access applications it has received in the last four years, critics 
argue that the FDA’s process is overly cumbersome and slow.210  Patients 
advocate for increased access to experimental drugs, despite the years of revisions 
to regulation and the increased number of exceptions and exemptions from the 
normal rules.  The “Right to Try” debate has ensued, existing alongside the Ebola 
epidemic and persisting over the last year.  In fact, the alarming fact is that in 
over twenty-four states in America, “Right to Try” legislation has been proposed, 
and in many instances passed by state legislatures, and which threaten to have 
innumerable and unknown consequences for the use of experimental drugs and 
the role of the FDA.  Indeed, it seems to many experts that “Right to Try” 
advocates, having begun their plight for drug reform during and after the Abigail 
Alliance litigation, wish to get rid of FDA oversight as well as the FDA’s role in 
providing earlier access to experimental treatment.  “Access advocates criticize 
the FDA’s substantive standards governing patient access, but what they really 
object to is the review requirement itself.”211  The movement could result in the 
removal of powerful drugs, without any evidence of safety or efficacy, from FDA 
jurisdiction.212 
Most importantly, advocates claim that this legislative movement will 
increase the number of patients who will access investigational products.213  
Remember, this number is unknown and could certainly be immeasurable since in 
most instances the conversation for now has involved only the “terminally ill” 
patients.  At the same time, patients who are not terminally ill but who suffer with 
no relief from existing treatments for their ailments—or face diseases without a 
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cure—will also be seeking to try experimental drugs.214  In other words, this 
movement could have undefined negative consequences for patients in general.  
We are left with the ultimate question that we faced during the AIDS crisis and 
continue to face as regulators and citizens battle over the proper use and 
availability of unapproved drugs:  “whether the gain in providing the terminally 
ill with a slim chance at prolonging life is worth endangering a process designed 
to ensure the public health and the development of safe, effective medicines.”215  
We may indeed never have an answer, but certainly ridding the issue of 
regulatory oversight and diminishing the power of the FDA’s jurisdiction and 
regulatory framework are not an answer. 
 The Ebola crisis and all that has been improved and created since the 
beginning of the public health crisis, as well as our experiences throughout the 
AIDS crisis should, instead of creating disdain and criticism against the idea of 
regulatory bodies in this space, highlight two important observations.  It is clear 
from the testimonials of U.S. commissioners in the FDA and U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, among others, that the Ebola crisis showed the harm 
and ineffectiveness of not having these bodies involved from the beginning, the 
benefit of using such regulatory bodies and frameworks effectively in addition to 
the importance of international regulatory cooperation. 
Let us use Ebola not as a ground for criticism of the FDA, its approval 
process and the regulation of using unapproved drugs, but rather as an instance to 
show how differently the crisis could have been handled with the efforts that were 
in place at the end, had they been present from the beginning.  Indeed, let us see 
the Ebola outbreak as an instance to think about how differently the crisis would 
have been handled absent any regulatory body to ensure that human rights were 
abided by, patients were educated, and treatments were adequately administered.  
It can be argued that despite the legal and ethical issues that were present, the 
regulatory bodies at least attempted to safeguard patient rights, something that 
would have been wholly absent if the crisis was governed merely by the natural 
human reaction. 
The bottom line is that criticism of “Right to Try” advocates is being 
misplaced.  The reasons for clinical trials, the importance of oversight, and the 
jurisdiction of the FDA—if practiced wholly and effectively—is to prevent the 
ethical risks highlighted above in Part III,Section A and allow the use of 
experimental treatments to be somewhat tolerable. 
As Dr. Arthur Caplan and Dr. Alison Bateman-House suggest, the “Right to 
Try” debate and the resulting legislation is simply an understandable “impulse to 
rescue individual patients facing dire diseases . . . .”216  Even though the FDA is 
mandated in the U.S. to ensure the safety and efficacy of drugs that enter the 
market, healthcare providers have a duty not to harm patients and pharmaceutical 
companies insist that the FDA “plays a vital role in both drug development and 
patient protection.”  The drug approval process is endangered at the behest of 
terminally ill patients and other advocates who demand to have FDA review of 
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requests for access to investigational drugs be dispensed with and wish to access 
unapproved drugs outside of clinical trials.  Again we battle the unresolved 
balance:  “an individual patient’s very understandable desire to try to extend his 
or her life versus the orderly and efficient functioning of a drug development and 
clinical trial system that benefits much larger numbers of patients.”217  Except this 
time we threaten to dissolve the FDA’s jurisdiction and threaten the safety and 
health of those who, without understanding the risks involved, will choose to 
ignore the risks and receive experimental treatments unfit for human 
consumption. 
 
To the advocates who ask, “What’s the harm?” in allowing 
unrestricted access, one expert responded, “If there’s anything 
worse than dying of a terminal illness, it’s dying of a terminal 
illness and suffering unnecessary complications or pain for no 
benefit and having to pay for the medications causing the 
complications yourself.”218 
 
The reforms these patients wish to enact are actually harmful on multiple 
levels:  to the pharmaceutical industry, to patient well-being, and to drug 
development—not to mention many of the difficult points raised earlier in this 
Note.  Generally speaking, the “Right to Try” laws that have been passed in states 
across the country permit terminally ill patients to request access to 
investigational drugs that have yet to be approved by the FDA.219  These laws 
create issues with inequitable access, lack of appropriate oversight, and informed 
consent.  Since the definition of the term “terminally ill” is unclear and can vary, 
it neglects to include patients who will not suffer from death but have 
nevertheless exhausted all existing treatment options.  Moreover, patients hope to 
receive experimental treatments without truly appreciating the potential health 
risks they could suffer should the treatment be ineffective.  “The overwhelming 
majority of drugs that are found to have manageable toxicity in phase I clinical 
trials do not subsequently receive FDA approval for marketing . . . . [In the end,] 
the terminally ill could potentially be shortening what little time they have 
left.”220  Additionally, there is a lack of oversight that occurs since there are no 
specified qualifications for the health care providers or physicians providing the 
assessments.  Patients are not guaranteed an optimum evaluation of their 
condition or their likely benefit from the experimental treatment.  No rules are in 
place “to stop the creation of research mills in which interventions with no 
scientific evidence are promoted as possible cures, which has happened in the 
field of stem-cell based treatments.”221 
Furthermore, these laws do not adequately provide for rules requiring 
informed consent nor do they realistically lead to a patient’s sufficient 
understanding of the best and the worst outcomes that could come from the use of 
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the experimental drugs.  The drugs used as a result of these laws are drugs that 
have only passed through Phase I testing.  In other words, they have only been 
tested for toxicity and adequate doses, not for safety or efficacy.222  The laws “are 
patently untruthful in stating that patients will be given a description of the 
‘potentially best and worst outcomes of using the investigational drug’ and a 
‘realistic description of the most likely outcomes.’”223  This may also lead patients 
to bypass opportunities for joining controlled clinical trials and instead be 
tempted to go with the falsehood of trying the “get-well-quick” option of 
receiving these unapproved drugs outside of a clinical trial with oversight.224  
Over time, this could slow down the approval process and thus lead to slower 
development of new drugs.225 
There are additional risks from which drug companies and the 
pharmaceutical industry could suffer.  The biggest issue in the new “right to try” 
legislation is that it does not require drug manufacturers and sponsors to comply 
and grant access to medications that have only passed Phase I clinical trials.  To 
most, the financial incentives will not be adequate enough for sponsors to allow 
expansive access to drugs in development that this new legislation seeks to 
provide.226  Adverse effects patients may suffer from such things as damaging 
toxicity levels could negatively impact a drug company’s ability to subsequently 
receive FDA approval.227  Such a problem will not be mitigated by the fact that 
doctors and drug companies are shielded from tort liability by “right to try 
legislation” legislation.228  If anything, drug companies would still be advised by 
legal professionals to go through the FDA approval process when given the 
choice.229  Thus, legislation that patients believe will grant them early access to 
drugs they would otherwise not receive will dissuade drug companies from 
making them available. 
What patients truly call for is deregulation in this area.  They want to gain 
access to medicines outside of the FDA’s jurisdiction, despite the mandates the 
FDA has received by law.  Bureaucracy may be cumbersome, protocols may at 
times seem useless, but deregulation of the use of pharmaceutical products should 
be looked at differently.  Overall, as case studies abroad have found, the 
deregulation of this industry has only led to unintended negative consequences. 
 
[M]edicines deregulation triggered two effects:  (i) it gave rise to 
some level of distrust towards cheaper alternatives to branded 
products, hence raised average medicines prices which in turn 
reduced access, and (ii) it reduced product surveillance, in turn 
leading to a lowering of the average quality of medicines.  
Therefore, we suggest that medicines deregulation can exert 
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detrimental effects by eroding trust in the quality of local 






 Observing the debate over experimental drugs throughout the AIDS crisis, 
the Ebola outbreak, and the “Right to Try” movement, one comes to many of the 
same conclusions.  The balance of interests between the terminally ill who wish 
to see increased access to unapproved medicines, the general public who has an 
interest in preserving the drug approval process, and the FDA who has been 
mandated by law to safeguard the safety of the general public creates tension that 
will continue to go unresolved.  The use of unapproved drugs is in and of itself 
controversial but using them in the midst of a public health crisis involving 
populations without adequate health systems or understanding of healthcare is 
that much more risky.  There is something about using drugs that have only been 
tested on monkeys that is disturbing, whether or not the patients are terminally ill.  
There is something legally unsound about “bending the rules” to create more 
exceptions to rules that preserve the safety of the public health.  There is also 
something immensely frustrating about an ethical balance that will never be 
resolved or further justified, even in an epidemic. 
 Critics of the FDA have persisted for years, pointing to the sluggishness of 
the drug approval process and the rights they think they own as citizens to 
personal autonomy in healthcare decisions—including access to any treatment 
that may be in existence, even if untested.  These criticisms, however, are in 
many instances without evidence.  The same research process and drug 
development process that patients and physicians criticize as overly costly and 
cumbersome is the same process that cures cancer, finds cures to fatal diseases, 
and makes up a large amount of industry in the U.S.  It is the same process that 
incentivizes drug developers to take risks to continue work and preserves the 
safety of the public health.  To that end, criticism of the FDA is misplaced. 
The lack of a cure or treatment options for certain diseases is not so much the 
fault of the FDA.  Take Ebola, for example.  If there is any criticism to be 
warranted, it should be pointed at the fact that the outbreak was resolved through 
the last minute scrambling of international organizations that should have had 
emergency protocols already in place and should have been cooperating on 
exchanges of information and drug development in times of normalcy.  The FDA 
should receive the increased funding and manpower it deserves so that their 
existing framework can be carried out more effectively, not eradicated.  Drug 
manufacturers should receive increased incentives to develop treatment options 
that, under normal circumstances, may not be the most lucrative to manufacture. 
Throughout the past twenty to thirty years in particular, criticisms and public 
health events have changed the nature of the regulatory framework in response.  
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Out of the AIDS crisis, expanded access exceptions to the normal drug approval 
process were born numerous—that continue to persist today.  Observing the ways 
in which the FDA has responded in past years to improve the efficacy of their 
review, and the ways in which the FDA collaborated with international 
institutions over the last three years, we see again the positive responses to a 
momentous public health event in our history.  With the large number of 
exceptions to the normal drug approval process providing increased access, 
however, it is difficult to envision how the regulatory framework for the use of 
experimental drugs could possibly be liberalized any more.   If the cycle 
continues as it has in the past after the AIDS crisis, however, we can expect 
criticisms and changes to occur nonetheless.  The “Right to Try” movement 
provides the opportunity for change, though not for the best.  Patients continue to 
advocate for routes outside of the FDA regulatory process and threaten to 
diminish the strength of the FDA’s presence and to remove many new, 
unapproved drugs from the FDA’s jurisdiction.  This can only lead to 
irresponsible uses of untested drugs and decreased growth in drug development.  
This sounds less like a death sentence for the terminally ill and for the general 
public and their interest in sound medicine.  It would truly be in the best interests 
of the public to continue to preserve the FDA’s regulatory role and mitigate any 
or all ethical risks associated with responding to terminal illness and infectious 
disease.  It is imperative to separate our natural human reactions from what the 
rational and appropriate course of action necessitates.  Desperate times should not 
always call for desperate measures. 
 
